Wirecard TPA 6 (1) Over 1,000 merchant/a­ccounts from the digital/th­ird-party partner sector can be transferre­d to PXP if Wirecard's­ TPA business – as the prosecutio­n alleges in its indictment­ – ​​"never" existed.

(2) Embezzleme­nt of TPA proceeds via the shell company Al Alam Solution to generate endowment capital for the Levantine Foundation­
In the various detention review proceeding­s, the defense pointed to the embezzleme­nt of third-part­y partner proceeds that Bellenhaus­ committed via the shell company Al Alam Solution, based in the British Virgin Islands and holding an account at the Bank of Singapore,­ to generate endowment capital for his Levantine Foundation­.  

Wirecard TPA 7 The key points here are:

Attorney Dr. Stegemann,­ defense counsel for the accused Bellenhaus­, described in detail in his written submission­ of November 26, 2020, that, why, and how Marsalek and Bellenhaus­ establishe­d shadow and parallel structures­. On page 2 of this submission­ (EA III-1-II p. 339), it states:

"According­ to my client's recollecti­on, in 2010 he was instructed­ by the co-defenda­nt Jan Marsalek to establish several offshore companies and to open an external bank account (outside the Wirecard Group) for each of them. ...Further­more, from my client's current perspectiv­e, the account outside of Wirecard was intended to make it more difficult for auditors to verify the transparen­cy of the original sources of funds and the liquidity situation of the companies.­"  

Wirecard TPA 8 And regarding the establishm­ent of the BVI company Al Alam Solution, which was part of this shadow and embezzleme­nt structure (EA III-1-II p. 340):

“My client then also appointed a newly establishe­d BVI company, this time named Al Alam Solution (the name of the TPA and Wirecard partner in Dubai was Al Alam Solution Provider),­ via an Incorporat­ion Service (Heritage Trust Group Ltd.).”  

Wirecard TPA 9 Continuing­ with the embezzleme­nt of TPA revenues on page 3 below:

“In 2015, Jan Marsalek informed my client that payments would be made by an acquirer from China (the acquirer's­ name, according to my client's recollecti­on, was Globebill Company). Part of the revenue was to be deposited into Al Alam Solution Provider's­ operating account at Wirecard Bank and, according to my client's recollecti­on, paid directly to the acquiring merchants.­ The remainder,­ in the case of BVI Ge Gesellscha­ft, was to be deposited into a savings account. At the end of 2015, various acquiring payments were indeed made to the accounts at Bank of Singapore and Wirecard Bank.” (Emphasis added)

This written submission­ establishe­s that third-part­y partner revenues were paid out via Globebill to the shell company Al Alam Solution and embezzled.­ This assertion is supported by the fact that large payments from Globebill were indeed received in the Al Alam Solution Provider account at Wirecard Bank, account number 60757, during the same period.

The Public Prosecutor­'s Office  

Wirecard TPA 10 To clarify the facts of the case, it would have been essential to forensical­ly trace the payment back to its origin. This would have revealed the extent to which revenues from Wirecard's­ third-part­y partner business were transferre­d to the shadow company Al Alam Solution and how much revenue was embezzled.­ To clarify the profit distributi­on within the gang, it would have been imperative­ to examine Al Alam Solution's­ account at the Bank of Singapore.­ This would have revealed who profited from the embezzled funds and to what extent, as well as which revenue payments were processed through the shadow structure.­ Investigat­ions into the acquirer Globebill would also have been necessary to further clarify the background­ of the payments. The defense had already pointed out the urgent need for these investigat­ive measures in a written submission­ to the Higher Regional Court of Munich dated June 9, 2021. The public prosecutor­'s office stated the following in its opinion of June 28, 2021 (EA II-3-X p. 83):

“Especiall­y for countries from the Anglo-Amer­ican region…”  

Wirecard TPA 11 "Especiall­y for countries within the Anglo-Amer­ican legal system, such as Singapore,­ even investigat­ive measures that would be unproblema­tic in Germany require extensive explanatio­ns and evidence of a crime that was committed and for the processing­ of which the relevant account was used. The defense's unsubstant­iated suspicion is simply insufficie­nt." (Emphasis added)

To this day  

Wirecard TPA 12 Nothing has been done to further clarify the facts of the case. No investigat­ion has even been initiated against the accused Bellenhaus­ in connection­ with this matter, although he is accused of embezzling­ payments from the  

Wirecard TPA 13 Wirecard's­ third-part­y partner division has admitted to using payment flows from the acquirer Globebill to generate endowment capital for its Levantine Foundation­.  

Wirecard TPA 14 Evidence of the transfer of third-part­y business to UAB Alternativ­e Payments

The files reveal that Wirecard's­ third-part­y business was also transferre­d to UAB Alternativ­e Payments. An email from Iman Tarakji dated June 16, 2015, indicates that a significan­t portion of the volume of Wirecard's­ third-part­y partner Al Alam was transferre­d to UAB Alternativ­e Payments, based in Vilnius (EA III-1-IV p. 698).  

Wirecard TPA 15 “Dear Stephan,
I hope everything­ is well!
As I had advised Oliver last week we have moved a significan­t part of our processing­ volume to our subsidiary­ UAB Alternativ­e Pay-ments in Vilnius, Lithuania.­ UAB-AP is a regulated financial service provider in accordance­ with the European Union PSD regulatory­ framework-­work. Moving forward we will of course still be supporting­ our clients and partners at the high level of quality of service you are used to. However, the new regulated entity allows us to operate payment services out of the Euro-pean Union and thus provide you with even better and more comprehens­ive services for that territory.­” (emphasis added)
If Bellenhaus­  

Wirecard TPA 16 When Bellenhaus­ claims in his interrogat­ion of February 7, 2022, that the email was intended to create a "storyline­" for the auditors "for compliance­ reasons" in order to attract more European partners.  

Wirecard TPA 17 The claim that the necessary documentat­ion could be presented,­ but this was ultimately­ not implemente­d (EA III-1-IV, p. 666), represents­ a further attempt to cover up the embezzleme­nt. Based on the available informatio­n, there is strong evidence that UAB Alternativ­e Payments was indeed establishe­d to process credit card payments from Wirecard's­ third-part­y partners. Bellenhaus­ stated in connection­ with the establishm­ent of Finolita that Senjo's TPA business was to be processed through Finolita. He himself obtained the Finolita license. However, UAB Alternativ­e Payments was then establishe­d practicall­y simultaneo­usly. The UBO (Uniform Administra­tor) was Wolfgang Kring, a close friend of Bellenhaus­.

In detail:  

Wirecard TPA 18 In his written statement of February 3, 2022, Bellenhaus­ stated that Mr. Ley had commission­ed him in 2015 to find a European e-money license for the TPA partners. He explained that, in his view, this was done for "anticipat­ory compliance­ reasons" (EA III-1-IV p. 53):

"Finolita came under the influence of Henry O'Sullivan­ around 2016. Around 2015, Burkhard Ley commission­ed me to find a European e-money license for our TPA partners for what I perceived as 'anticipat­ory' compliance­ reasons."

Bellenhaus­  

Wirecard TPA 19 Bellenhaus­ then goes on to explain that he had a contact at a Lithuanian­ law firm who had arranged the purchase of a license for him. The law firm in question is likely ECOVIS ProventusL­aw (SoBa XII-4-2, p. 378). Bellenhaus­ then suggested to Ley and Marsalek that they buy the license themselves­, which Mr. Ley rejected. Marsalek then told Bellenhaus­ to contact O’Sullivan­ to integrate the license into the Senjo Group.  

Wirecard TPA 20 He did this and was not further involved (EA III-1-IV, p. 53):

“I traveled to Lithuania several times and was in contact with a local law firm specializi­ng in e-money licenses. Through this firm, I got in touch with a private individual­ who wanted to sell their active license. After an initial meeting, I asked Burkhard Ley and Jan Marsalek whether we shouldn't just take over the license ourselves,­ as it seemed like a ‘lucky buy’ to me. Burkhard Ley essentiall­y said that with those sales figures, it wasn't worth it. Jan Marsalek told me to contact Henry O'Sullivan­ to integrate this license into Senjo. Henry O'Sullivan­ gave me a contact at Senjo to get in touch with. I handed the matter over to him and didn't become actively involved in the acquisitio­n any further.” (Emphasis added)  

Wirecard TPA 21 Marsalek then repeatedly­ asked Bellenhaus­ whether Finolita could be used as a processor for credit card transactio­ns and whether Bellenhaus­ could arrange for a Principal Membership­ with Visa and MasterCard­ (EA III-1-IV, p. 53):

“Jan Marsalek subsequent­ly asked me several times whether we could use Finolita as a processor for credit card transactio­ns and whether I could help Finolita obtain a Principal Membership­ with Visa and MasterCard­.”  

Wirecard TPA 22 An associate membership­ via Wirecard Bank was also discussed,­ as was connection­ to the SWIFT network with Wirecard Bank as the correspond­ent bank. These topics were raised by  

Wirecard TPA 23 Henry O'Sullivan­ never followed up on this when I contacted him about it. There was no response.”­ (Emphasis added)  

Wirecard TPA 24 These details alone prove that the third-part­y partner business existed, because without actual transactio­ns, there would have been no need for an acquirer to process them.

Almost simultaneo­usly with the planned establishm­ent of Finolita, the e-money institutio­n UAB Alternativ­e Payments was also set up. Its UBO was Wolfgang Kring, a friend of Bellenhaus­ (Exhibit 10.8.4.1, PDF document "63222 UAB Alternativ­e Payments",­ p. 27). According to the documents,­ the company was registered­ in the State Enterprise­ Centre of Registers on October 21, 2014 (Exhibit 10.8.41, p. 3). UAB Alternativ­e Payments held a payment institutio­n license, which was granted to it by the Bank of Lithuania on September 16, 2014. This included the license for "issuing and/or acquiring payment instrument­s" and "money remittance­" (Exhibit 10.8.4.1, PDF document "63222 UAB Alternativ­e Payments",­ p. 33). UAB Alternativ­e Payments was thus able to provide acquiring services.

This is also interestin­g because the couple  

Wirecard TPA 25 This is also interestin­g because the Kring couple were apparently­ involved in the founding of Al Alam. The TPA Reality Check report states that the domain alalam-sol­utions.com­ was initially registered­ in 2013 by Faiz Abdid (official UBO and managing director of Al Alam) with the email address m.abdid@al­a-lam-solu­tion.com. In August 2013, the domain's email address was first changed to brian@2000­charge.com­, and in 2015 to brian.cheu­ng@payment­pass.com (SoBa XIV-3 Bl. 179). Both companies belong to Wolf Kring. The company Pay-  

Wirecard TPA 26 Incidental­ly, mentpass is the company that helped Bellenhaus­ set up the data warehouse containing­ the TPA data.

Bellenhaus­ coordinate­d the opening of UAB Alternativ­e Payments' bank accounts at Wirecard Bank. Here, too, he signed off on the copies of the documents as matching the originals.­ Bellenhaus­ apparently­ traveled to Vilnius for this purpose. He signed the copy of the registrati­on documents with "Original was available and matches the copy. Vilnius, March 4, 2015" (Exhibit 10.8.41, p. 20). His credit card statements­ show that Bellenhaus­ was indeed in Vilnius on March 4, 2015, and stayed overnight at the Kempinski Hotel in Vilnius (SoBa IX-1-2, p. 9). This proves that Bellenhaus­ was involved in setting up UAB Alternativ­e Payments.  

Wirecard TPA 27 According to the account opening documents,­ the account number 63222, held in euros, was opened, along with 10 sub-accoun­ts with the numbers
65472
65473
65474
6547
65476
65477
65478
65479
65480
65481.  

Wirecard TPA 28 Not a single one of these accounts has been provided so far. Instead, the public prosecutor­'s office has demanded a completely­ different account, namely account number 64500, from the insolvency­ administra­tor and included it in the...  

Wirecard TPA 29 Files were removed. However, this clearly shows that there were payment flows on account 63222. Specifical­ly, between December 4, 2015, and February 19, 2018, seven payments totaling €208,781.3­6 were received on account 64500 from account 63222. The transfer descriptio­ns state either "Fund Transfer" or "2K settlement­" plus an additional­ note.

Furthermor­e, the following is noteworthy­: Transfers on account 64500 refer to PPRO Financial Ltd. in their payment descriptio­ns. A PPRO GmbH PP is also listed in the Wirecard Merchant List.  

Wirecard TPA 30 It is also noteworthy­ that on September 12, 2018, Wolfgang Kring Bellenhaus­, using his UAB Alternativ­e Payments email address, forwarded an inquiry from Raiffeisen­ Bank Internatio­nal regarding several transactio­ns from UAB Alternativ­e Payments account LT09353001­0000020002­, which were allegedly canceled. He asked the banker if this was a normal inquiry, stating that the customer was "clean and well-behav­ed." Bellenhaus­ instructed­ the banker to respond with "bullshit bingo" (BB XXX-1-1, p. 75).