Der Doomsday Bären-Thread
| eröffnet am: | 30.01.06 01:03 von: | Anti Lemming |
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Besonders "schön" fand ich:
When 80% of option-ARM holders -- according to some reports -- are paying less than their monthly interest, so that their loan balances are actually increasing while their home values may be dropping, well, I'm pretty sure rationality has taken a vacation.
Lest bitte auch meine Anmerkungen zum gesunkenen Ölpreis (unten).
Barry Ritholtz Blog
Welcome Back My Friends . . .
in Commodities | Employment | Energy | Inflation | Markets | Psychology/SentimentWith the Summer officially over, the masses of traders, fund managers and corporate honchos return to their trading turrets, offices and desks, ready to kick it out for the last four months of the year.
What's on their minds? Here's a quick overview:
Bullish
• Its no coincidence that Crude Oil is at a 3 month low and the indices are at a 3 month highs.
• The biggest North American Oil find in a generation may add further pressure to Oil prices;
• Performance anxiety is a powerful factor that could draw more players into equities;
• We are 7 weeks away from the best seasonal period for equities;
• Mortgage prices have slipped to 5 week lows, perhaps providing a respite to the floundering housing market;
• The major trend in the equity market since June is upwards.
• Bond rally seems to have ended; Rotation away from fixed income into equities is possible;
• Recent economic data puts the Fed on hold at least another 2 months;
• Earnings period is over, with most S&P500 companies reporting better than expected;
• With the summer over, Momentum is with the Bulls.
Bearish
• Much of the good news is baked into stock prices already;
• Since the mid-June low, the SPX has rallied nearly 10%;
• Markets have rallied on decreasing volume and breadth;
• Complacency has returned, as the VIX reachs 3 month lows;
• The American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) reported there are now only 25.84% bears, down from a peak of 57.8% on July 19;
• Markets are enetering the most dangerous 2 month stretch of the year;
• The economy is slowing significantly; Employment has trended downwards:
2004: 175,000/mo
2005: 165,000/mo
2006: 140,000/mo
Past five months: 119,000/mo• Forward Guidance out of many companies has been weak;
• Q3 warning period is a few weeks away;
• Earnings gains have been concentrated in the biggest companies; The bulk of firms beneath the SPX are struggling;
• Despite lower rates, Mortgage purchase apps fell to their lowest level in August since 2003;
• Retail sales are slowing;
• Inflation remains ever present;
Neutral/Unknown?
• What will returning traders do? Fear missing a run and jump into the fray, or take advantage of higher prices and hit bids ?
• Will the political control of the House of Representatives flip in November ?
• How will the situation in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran impact consumer sentiment -- and spending ?
These are the elements worth watching, as we return to what is often the most interesting part of the calendar -- back to school, end of Q3; year end Holidays, and 4th Quarter.
Anmerkung zum gesunkenen Ölpreis: (Relativ) billiges Öl nimmt den Inflationsdruck aus der (US-)Wirtschaft und sorgt für mehr Kaufkraft, was im Prinzip positiv ist. Andererseits stellt sich die Frage, warum der Ölpreis überhaupt gesunken ist. Sollte dies durch sinkende Nachfrage infolge der schwächelnden Wirtschaft bedingt sein (der Dow Jones Transportation Index hat z. B. stark verloren in den letzten Monaten), so wäre dies negativ.
Ingesamt lässt sich beobachten, dass der S&P-500 und der Ölpreis im großen und ganzen synchron laufen. Steigt Öl, steigt auch der SP-500, und umgekehrt. Das liegt offenbar an der hohen Marktkapitalisierung der Ölfirmen. Ist das Öl teuer, verdienen sie mehr, und Ölaktien steigen, was auch den SP-500 hievt. In den letzten drei Monaten jedoch haben Ölaktien wegen des rückläufigen Ölpreises kräftig verloren haben. Entsprechend ließ auch der SP-500 Federn.
Die Frage lautet daher: Was wirkt stärker? Der mögliche wirtschaftliche Aufschwung durch billigeres Öl, oder die Kursrückgänge der Ölaktien, die den SP-500 nach unten ziehen?
Die Tatsache, dass Ölpreis und SP-500 korrelieren, lässt mich eher das zweite vermuten.
Beim Mini-Crash im Mai war klar zu beobachten, dass alle Assets gleichzeitig fielen. Es gab einen Ausverkauf quer durch die Bank: Aktien, Gold, Rohstoffe, Öl usw. stürzten synchron. Die Tatsache, dass Öl jetzt wieder stark fällt und die Indizes seit drei Tagen mit (bis auf die IMHO techn. Erholung am Freitag), ist vor diesem Hintergrund nicht beruhigend (für Longs). Es könnte sich jetzt ein neuer Aktien/Öl/Gold/Rohstoff/Aktien-Ausverkauf wie im Mai anbahnen - das fallende Öl ist dabei womöglich ein Vorbote.
oil.gif (verkleinert auf 51%)
Bisher verlief alles mustergültig.
oil.gif (verkleinert auf 51%)
How Bearish Does The Stock Market Get During a Recession? 28% Down…or Growling in Bearishness
Nouriel Roubini | Sep 05, 2006How sharply will the US stock market fall if my recession call ends up being correct? Given the recent flow of macro news, the likelihood of a US hard landing has certainly increased; thus, it is important to assess the implication of such growth slowdown, hard landing or outright recession on the stock market.
As I predicted at the time of my recession call, the Fed decision to pause and then stop would lead to a suckers’ rally. This typical suckers' rally always occurs at the beginning of an economic slowdown that leads to recession. The first reaction of markets to such bad economic news is usually a stock market rally based on the belief that a Fed pause and then possibly easing will rescue the economy. This is always a suckers' rally as, over time, the perceived beneficial effects of a Fed ease meet the reality of the investors realizing that a recession is coming and that the effects of such a recession on profits and earnings are first order while the effects of the Fed easing on the economy and stock market are - in the short run of a recession - only second order. That is why you can expect another suckers' in early fall when the Fed will actually reduce the Fed Funds rate. But, as the continued flow of poor macro news increases the probability of a recession, the equity markets will - in due time – sharply fall when wave of news and macro developments hits hard a weakened and vulnerable economy; then you will see a serious bearish market in equities.
Actually, the initial equity market response to the August 8th FOMC statement was tentative as the statement was interpreted by the markets as suggesting that maybe the Fed was not done yet and that further hikes in the fall could not be ruled out. I had then predicted – even before the August 8th statement - that the then almost sure Fed pause was actually a stop and that the next Fed move would be a cut – not a hike – in the fall or winter. Markets were behind the curve in realizing the downside risks to growth and were still debating whether the “temporary” Fed pause would be followed by a hike. It then took the mild PPI and CPI reports to radically shift the market consensus from the view that the pause was temporary before another hike to the view that the pause was actually a full stop with some possibility – still in a minority view – of a Fed Funds cut in late 2006 or 2007. It was then – when the consensus moved from pause-to-hike to pause-to-stop – that the stock market has its true post-FOMC suckers’ rally as the market finally expressed relief to the news that a full stop was not more likely. You may indeed see another suckers’ rally when – following even more bad macro growth news – the consensus will move towards a higher probability of a Fed Funds cut – rather than just a protracted pause.
It is well known – from basic macro theory – that the equity market reaction to poor growth news is ambiguous. Lower than expected growth lead to a higher stock market value via the “interest rate channel” and to a lower stock market value via the “profits/earnings channel”. The former effect derives from the fact that bad economic news increase the probability that the Fed will ease monetary policy and thus stimulate the economy, demand and profits. The latter channel derives from the fact that slower growth – or even worse an outright recession – will lead to lower demand, lower revenues and lower profits. Indeed, as stock prices are forwards looking and equal to the discounted value of dividends where the discount rate is related to an appropriate measure of interest rates, bad growth news affect the numerator and denominator of the ratio of dividends to the appropriate discount rate. Usually, the first effect dominates at the beginning of an economic slowdown – when the likelihood of a slowdown is high but the likelihood of a true hard landing or recession is still low and unclear: then the interest rate channel dominates the profits channel. But once the signal of a hard landing or recession become clearer and the likelihood of such hard landing much higher the profits channel dominates the interest rate channel.
Why is this conceptual discussion important? Now that the likelihood of a hard landing or even a recession has increased – even in the eyes of otherwise perma-bulls – one is starting to hear and read with increasing frequency some Goldilocks statements such as “a hard landing will be good for stocks” or “the stock market will rally during a recession” or “the Fed will rescue the markets during a recessionary hard landing”.
For example the WSJ recently was reporting the following:
Widely followed Wall Street economists were telling clients that even a significant economic weakening might actually be good for stocks.
"If we could have a hard landing but not a recession, I think that would be a favorable outcome for the financial markets," says economist Ed Hyman of New York research and brokerage house International Strategy & Investment. Should the Fed start to worry that it has slowed the economy too much, Mr. Hyman says, then it would have to cut rates sharply. Investors would welcome the rate decline as a boost to growth, consumer spending, the housing market and profits.
"History tells me that a significant weakening in the economy and a crisis-induced reversal of Fed policy could make this stock market move up dramatically," he says.
While the well-respected Hyman made a distinction between a “hard landing” and a “recession” and argued that a hard landing could be good for stocks, it is not clear what he means with a hard landing? A slowdown to of growth to 2.5% or 2% or 1%? The fuzziness of his remark hides the typical market perspective that a sharp economic slowdown, short of a recession, could actually be good for the stock market.
To clear the air from the spin that one is increasingly hearing it is useful to ask a simple factual question: what is the relation between stock markets and recessions? So, for a moment, let us leave aside the issue of whether my recession call is correct or not. And let us assume, for the sake of the pure logical argument, that a recession is coming and then ask the question: if we will have a recession, what will happen to the stock market? So, you do not have to believe in a recessionary hard landing to consider this specific question. You just need to ask yourself the simple question of what happens to stock prices when recessions do come. (Thus, for now I will aside the question of what happens to the stock market when you get a “soft landing” or “hard landing” short of a recession. I will consider this question in a future discussion)
Luckily we have enough data series on previous recession and stock prices to give an answer to this question. Consider the charts that are shown below. They present the percentage change in that S&P500 index around the last six U.S. recessions (i.e. starting with 1970), i.e. in the months before the start of a recession, in the months during a recession and in the months after it. The vertical lines in each charts represents the peak of the business cycle (i.e. the beginning of a recession) and its trough (end of a recession). On average the stock market does not change much between the peak and the trough of the business cycle: on average the fall is only 0.4% between peak and trough; in some recessions – such as the 1974-1975 one - the peak-to-trough fall is much deeper (-13%) but in others – such as the 1980 one – stock prices actually rose 5.8% between peak and trough; so -0.4% is an average for all recessions.
This may seem like a relatively small adjustment but the peak-to-trough comparison is deceptive. It is deceptive because, usually, the stock market starts to fall before a recession starts (i.e. before the business cycle peak), then it falls very sharply during the first stage of a recession, and then in starts to recover in the late stages of a recession before the recession has reached its bottom (i.e. before the trough of the recession). Specifically, the stock market falls from the peak in the business cycle to its lowest level during a recession averages 17.5%; and in every one of these six recessions you have the same pattern: initially stock prices sharply fall as the economy enters a recession. Then, the recovery of the stock market starts before the trough of the business cycle has occurred, i.e. before the economy has gotten out of a recession.
Notice also that, in most episodes, the stock market peaks a few months before the actual start of the recession and starts falling even before the formal start of the recession (i.e. before the peak of the business cycle). Since stock prices almost always start to fall a few months before the recession has formally started – as signals of an impending slowdown and possible recession are already mounting even before a recession is formally triggered and thus priced in the stock market – the cumulative fall in stock prices from their pre-recession peak to their bottom level in the actual recession is well above the 17.5% figure for the stock price fall from the start of a recession to the lowest level of such stock prices during a recession. This average fall in stock prices from pre-recession peak to into-recession bottom is actually close to 28%, an extremely severe and sharp bearish downfall.
In other terms, the peak-to-trough average flat behavior of the stock market hides a much sharper fall in the stock market before a recession and during the first half or so of a recession, followed by a relatively sharp recovery in the late stages of a recession. This pattern makes total sense as equity prices are forward looking and, at any point in time, they reflect all available information about the expected path of current and future dividends/earning and interest rates. The stock market starts to fall before a recession has formally started because the closer you get to the peak of the business cycle when the macro news on growth become increasingly weaker, the higher is the probability that a recession will occur and will thus drag down profits. So, a forward looking equity market peaks before the peak of the business cycle and starts falling before the actual recession has started. That is why stock prices tend to be a good – if imperfect - leading indicator of the business cycle.
The fall in the stock market from the peak of the business cycle to the market lowest level in the recession was 21.0% in the 1970 recession, 33.88% in the 1974-75 recession, 10.6% in the 1980 recession, 18.2% in the 1981-82 recession, 14.6% in the 1990 recession, 10.3% in the 2001 recession. In most recession, as discussed above, the stock market peaks before the recession and starts to fall even before the recession has formally started. In the 1970 episode the stock market peaked 9 months before the recession and fell 12% even before the recession started. In the 1974-75 episode, the stock market peaked 12 months before the start of the recession and fell 23% even before the recession formally started in December 1973 with a good half of this pre-recession drop right after the beginning of the Yom Kippur war that led to Arab oil embargo. An exception is the 1980 episode when the stock market was actually rising in the few months before the start of the recession in February 1980. In the 1981-82 case, the stock market peaked four months before the onset of the recession and then fell already about 4% before the recession actually started. In the 1990 case, the stock market peaked two month before the recession and fell about 2% before the formal start of the recession. In the 2001 episode, the S&P peaked about seven months before the start of the recession in March 2001 and then fall by 31% even before the recession started (the peak of the Nasdaq was, of course even earlier, in March 2000 a full year before the formal onset of the recession).
Of course, in the economic history of the US in the last few decades sometimes stock prices have fallen and a recession has not materialized, i.e .stock markets are not a perfect and uniquely correct leading indicator of a recession. But, and this is more important in the context of the question asked above, any time a recession did occur, the stock market actually sharply fell. So, the issue here is not whether the stock market may at times provide false alarms or incorrect signals of the business cycle; of course, as it is well known, it does at times provide false signals. The issue is whether hard landing and beginning of recessions are associated with sharply falling stock prices. And the simple and unequivocal answer is that recession lead to bearish stock markets where the peak in the economy to the trough in the stock market (as separate from the economic peak-to-trough that lags the one of asset prices) is about 17.5% and where the peak-to-trough in the stock market (i.e. the pre-recession peak to the into-recession bottom of the stock market) is about 28%, i.e a very clear, sharp and deep bear market. So, factually hard landings and recessions do lead to falling stock prices and bear stock markets. So, the recent market buzz and chatter about hard landings and recessions being good for the stock market is utter nonsense based on actual data from decades of US business cycles and repeated recession episodes.
Of course, once a recession has triggered a severe bear market, at some point – before the bottom of the recession – the stock market does start to recover. The fact that the stock market recovers before the trough of the business cycle is reach is also logical and based on the forward looking nature of stock prices: even before a recession has ended the rate of economic activity fall tends to increase: in early stage of a recession the first derivative of output is negative (negative growth) while the second derivative shows an acceleration of the rate of economic contraction. In later stages of a recession, the first derivative is still negative but the second derivative shows a slower rate at which the economy is contracting and signals that the trough of the business cycle may be close, i.e. there is incoming light at the end of the recession tunnel. Thus, for forward looking stock prices it is not necessary to wait until the recession is over for such prices to recover: once the evidence is building up that the worst stage of a recession is close to be over and that the trough – bottom of the downturn – will be reached soon (i.e. the probability that the recession will be over soon is increasing) then the stock markets starts to recover: i.e. stock prices reach their trough before the trough of the business cycle.
How about “soft landing” episodes, i.e. episode where a Fed tightening did not lead to an outright recession but rather to a significant slowdown of the economy and then an economic recovery? The only recent episode of a successful soft landing is 1994-95 when a 300bps tightening by the Fed in 1994 did not lead to a recession but rather a relatively sharp slowdown in the economy. Note that, even in that episode, the Fed risked overdoing it and it eased the Fed Funds rate in 1995 when the slowdown appeared as excessive and risking to jeopardize an economic growth that was on the cusp of the internet and information technology revolution of the mid-late 1990s. Note also that, in that episode, the economy was just coming out of a painful recession that, while it formally ended in 1991, was followed by a job-loss and then a job-less recovery in 2002 and 2003; only by early 1994 the economy was showing signs of rapid growth and employment recovery. So, in term of economic cycle, the monetary tightening of 1994-95 was at a very different stage of the business cycle, early-mid recovery and the Fed was just bringing back the Fed Funds rate to a neutral level after its sharp easing during the 1990-91 recession. In terms of the market consequences of such a “soft landing”, the S&P500 fell by 5% between January and December 1994 as the Fed tightening was under way and the economy was starting to decelerate following the monetary break imposed by the Fed. Thus, while the S&P had started to briskly recover after the 1990-91 recession and had double digit return both in 1992-93 and from 1995 on, the soft landing of the economy in 1994 led to a significant fall in the stock market: while the fall in 1994 was modest – about 5% - since the underlying trend in the market index for a sharp double digit annual recovery since 1992 and after 1995, the soft landing of 1994 implied an underperformance of the stock market relative to its underlying trend that was of the order of 17%, i.e. without the soft landing slowdown of 1994 the market could have grown – based on the underlying trend of the S&P – by at least 17%.
What are the potential caveats to the arguments above that a US recession would lead to a sharp drop in the stock market? Some argue that the sharp fall in equity prices during previous recession occurred after long periods in which the market was bullish and sharply increasing; thus, close to a recession P/E ratios were already excessively high and bound to adjust; also the monetary and credit tightening in previous recession squeezed severely profits and push equity prices lower. Instead, it is argued that today’s conditions are very different from previous growth slowdowns: equity prices have zig-zagged without much of a strong trends for the last six years while earnings have sharply increased given increased profitability of the corporate sector; thus, the argument goes, P/E ratios are now relatively low and valuations are not inflated; if anything, given the surge in earnings valuations are relative low and bound to rise if a soft landing occurs or bound not to fall as much even if a hard landing occurs. Specifically, unless a major credit crunch or monetary tightening leads to a sharp fall in profits and earnings, equity valuations may not be as much at risk in a US hard landing scenario.
The above arguments require a whole separate discussion of earnings and profits and their likely future trends that I will undertake in a separate future blog or paper. For now, let me observe why these arguments are not convincing. First, in a recession revenues fall and both profits and earnings sharply fall; so equity valuations need to take a hit; and while recessions triggered by a credit crunch or severe monetary tightening have more severe effects on corporate profits even recessions triggered by the bursting of a bubble – the tech bubble in 2000, the housing bubble today – can severely affect earnings and thus valuations. Second, recent data from the Q2 GDP numbers suggest a very rapid slowdown in real profits in Q2, to something close to 2% in real terms down from a growth rate of 12% in Q1. Thus, profits slowdown is already occurring; and outside the S&P500 firms and outside the energy and financial sectors, Q2 earnings are also already showing serious sluggishness. Third, on a cyclically adjusted basis P/E ratios are still very high: since both profits and earnings now look peaky and bound to sharply slow down, P/Es may be still too high once one considers the likely fall in earnings during a slowdown and/or an outright recession. Of course, the fact that valuations have been relative flat for a number of years may imply that not all stocks will be hit as hard in a recession: many will gradually fall during the economic downturn but others, that have low valuations now and whose earnings would be less affected by a recession, may do relatively better or not as bad as the overall market. Still, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a recession would be really bad for the stock market. In every previous recession equities have done very poorly and it is hard to make a logical or empirical argument why in the next recession things would be meaningfully different.
Finally, notice that the equity valuations of homebuilders have already followed the pattern that I described above. While the overall economy has not yet fallen into a recession, the housing sector is certainly in a major bust right now; the severe worsening of the housing market has been indeed clear for several months now as sales, profits and earnings have sharply fallen for the Toll Brothers, many other producers of McMansions and homebuilders in general. And indeed equity valuations for homebuilders have already sharply fallen, by about 40% relative to their peaks of last year. Does the earliest bust of the housing sector relative to the overall economy imply that homebuilders’ equity valuations - that have already sharply fallen – will bottom out earlier than those for the general stock market during the coming slowdown and recession? Not necessarily as the sharp fall of the housing sector and the depth of the housing bust may be much deeper and more protracted than that of the overall economy. So, one cannot assume that housing sector’s stock market valuations will bottom out before the overall stock market does during the coming economic downturn.
The discussion above clarifies what one should expect if – as I have predicted – the US slowdown accelerates into a hard landing and a recession: based on historical experience the stock market is likely fall sharply by about 28% from peak to the trough of the equity market before it is starts to recover in the late stages of the recession. So beware of the large amount of bullish spin that is being peddled today by bulls that are now starting to recognize that a hard landing or a recession is more likely: they need to spin the bad news about the economy as suggesting that such bad news are actually very good news for the stock markets. For these perma-bulls good economic news are very good for the stock market and bad economic news are also very good for the stock markets (as the reaction (“I guess it is probably a buying opportunity”) to my bearish call by the Squawk Box anchor interviewing me last week suggests. But savvy investors will not let themselves to be fooled by such non-sequitur arguments and will cautiously adjust their portfolio to reduce the risk of being stuck in a bear market when the recession actually gets under way.
Kurzfristig -up
mittelfristig- down
langfristig-up???
mfg nf
Die extrem hohe Zahl an Euro-Longs der Hedgefonds [offene Position der Euro-Futures steht auf 10-Jahres-Hoch] ist schon fast ein Automatismus, der den Dollar-Absturz verhindert. Wenn der Dollar überhaupt abstürzt, dann nicht, ohne vorher noch einmal auf EUR/USD 1,18 zu steigen und alle Euro-Longs rauszuekeln - wie Warren Buffett, der Anfang 2005 bei 1,35 long gegangen war und Ende des Jahres um 1,20 rausgegangen ist. Gesamtverlust: 1 Milliarde Dollar.
Ich hab, den Dollar-Risiken Rechnung tragend, meine Dollar-Position halbiert, so dass ich Euro und Dollar im Verhältnis 50 : 50 gewichte. Sollte der Euro noch einmal über 1,30 steigen, würde ich bei erkennbarer Top-Bildung wieder zu 100 % in den Dollar gehen. Das Doomsday-Szenario, wonach der Dollar auf 1,80 abstürzen soll, halte ich für unwahrscheinlich. Da ich viele Puts auf den SP-500 halte, wäre ich gegen dieses Risiko ohnehin "ge-hedge-t", weil die US-Indizes dann sicherlich auch stark fallen würden.
Die Realzinsen auf den Dollar sind zurzeit 1,25 %, auf den Euro 0,6 %. Dass die Dollarzinsen sinken, halte ich noch nicht für ausgemacht, da die Inflationstendenzen in USA stark sind. Der Bondmarkt hat US-Zinssenkungen eingepreist - erkennbar an der invertierten Zinskurve. Hintergrund ist die Erwartung, die Fed müsse wegen der kommenden Rezession die Zinsen senken. Ich glaube aber eher an Stagflation, und die Inflation wird die Zinssenkungen verhindern.
Fazit: IMHO lohnt es sich nicht, jetzt noch gegen den Dollar zu wetten, und solange es bei der erwarteten Seitwärtsbewegung höhere Realzinsen gibt als auf den Euro, macht man sogar ein Geschäft.
In Japan gab es 1990 ebenfalls eine Immobilienblase, sie wog aber schwerer, da Korruption mit im Spiel war, außerdem ging es vorwiegend um Geschäfts-Immobilien. In USA betreffen die aktuellen Probleme vorwiegend den Privatverbraucher und schwächen damit den Konsum. (Eine Büroimmobilien-Krise gab es auch schon in USA: Anfang 1990 ging in der S&L-Krise u. a. die "Bank of New England" den Bach runten).
Offenbar leiden in USA aber auch jetzt Banken unter säumigen Hypothekenzahlungen. Probleme gibt es vor allem bei "sub-prime"-Hauskäufern, die ohne Eigengeld zu anfänglichen Lockvogel-Raten gekauft hatten (s. P 500/501). Die melden bei Zahlungsunfähigkeit (d. h. wenn die ersten regulären Hypothekenraten fällig werden) einfach schnell Privatinsolvenz an, und die Banken bleiben auf der Differenz zwischen dem ursprünglichen Kaufpreis des Hauses (höher) und dem Zwangsversteigerungserlös sitzen. Einige Regional- und Hypo-Banken haben in den US bereits Probleme, es gab auch Kurseinbrüche wie bei H&R (HRB). Der Banken-Index BKX schwächelt ebenfalls.
Insgesamt dürfte das Fiasko in USA aber glimpflicher ausgehen als das in Japan.
Den Gläubigern bleibt nur die Möglichkeit, ihre Anleihen auf dem freien Markt an Hedgefonds zu verkaufen. Die zahlen aber nur 16 % der Nominale - macht satte 86 % Verlust.
The Boston Globe
Cash from the past?
By Steven Syre, Globe Columnist | December 14, 2004
Many of them have been extraordinarily patient; some died waiting. A few are relative newcomers sensing an opportunity.
They are all owners of debt in the failed Bank of New England, a dusty old chapter in Boston business history but also an estate that has lived on for nearly 14 years in US Bankruptcy Court. Their big payback, possibly worth more than $500 million, finally may be around the corner.
How long has it been? Young Roger Clemens was the Red Sox Opening Day pitcher in 1991, the year Bank of New England was seized by regulators in a colossal bank failure that shook the financial world. Larry Bird and Kevin McHale still wore Celtics uniforms. That's how long.
Ben Branch, a finance professor at the University of Massachusetts who became the trustee in the bankruptcy case, has spent the past decade suing everyone in sight on behalf of creditors. He sued over insurance covering directors and officers, the role of financial advisers to Bank of New England, and even a surplus in the pension fund. His biggest success, prying $140 million from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., assured Bank of New England's senior creditors the return of all of their money plus a modest amount of interest.
But those recoveries pale in comparison to the potential payoff from a federal lawsuit against former Bank of New England auditor Ernst & Young, scheduled to go to trial Jan. 10 in Boston. The gist: Auditors didn't do their job, and investors paid the consequences. Last-ditch mediation talks broke down without a settlement last week.
Branch is pressing a claim for about $220 million, but the meter has been running for years. Tack on interest and the number grows to about $520 million.
A big win would be a bonanza for Bank of New England's junior creditors, investors who own a type of bonds that put them toward the back of the line in bankruptcy court. They've received zip so far for their securities, which have a face value of $525 million.
"From the juniors' perspective, this is the ball game," says Branch.
But the game could be over before it begins. Creditors says Ernst & Young has been in this situation before and built a track record of settling out of court. Branch declined to comment about the potential for a last-minute settlement, as did a spokesman for Ernst & Young.
Branch would make any potential deal, but has to keep the wishes of creditors in mind. Gary Himber, a securities broker in New Jersey who serves as the chairman of the creditors' committee, suggested a number in the $400 million range would be required to get bondholders excited about a settlement.
Exactly who owns Bank of New England's junior bonds is becoming a more interesting question as the trial date approaches. Himber says hedge fund managers have been calling him with an interest in the case, and the bonds.
Those bonds have never stopped trading, though volume is thin. They traded recently at about 16 cents on the dollar, up from about 12 cents a few months ago, says Himber.
George Putnam III of New Generation Advisers in Boston, which invests in distressed securities, bought some of the Bank of New England junior bonds for less than a penny on the dollar so long ago he's not sure of the year, 1996 or 1997. "I bought them as a long-term option," Putnam says. "The long-term part has certainly turned out to be true."
The story could still end badly for creditors. Ernst & Young could go to trial and win. But that isn't the way cases like this normally work.
There probably will be good things ahead for those who have waited. In this case, they've waited a very long time.
Steven Syre is a Globe columnist. He can be reached at syre@globe.com.
© Copyright 2006 Globe Newspaper Company.
NEW YORK TIMES
When a Big Bank Went Under, U.S. Presence Stemmed the Panic
By STEVE LOHR
Jean Driscoll, the manager of the Bank of New England branch in Chestnut Hill, Mass., went to work on the morning of Jan. 4 expecting it to be just another Friday in the affluent Boston suburb. But there was nothing routine about it. By 8:30 A.M., there were long lines of anxious depositors at the tellers' windows and cash machines, withdrawing their money. The phones rang steadily with calls from worried customers. Bank officers tried to calm account holders, assuring them that their savings were federally insured up to $100,000. But to little effect. There were similar scenes at many of the Bank of New England's 300 branches. Frantic depositors pulled nearly $1 billion out of the bank in two days; small savers trooped through the lobbies with their money in wallets, bulging envelopes and briefcases, and money managers yanked out multimillion-dollar deposits by remote control with computer and telex orders... (gekürzt, der Rest der Archiv-Story kostet Geld - A.L.)
February 18, 1991 Series
http://www.boerse-online.de/tools/ftd/1293644.html
Ich kann eine Verbindung nicht ausmachen. Eher zu den Zinsen und
da siehts nicht so gut aus. Was ich auch nicht so prickelnd finde, ist
der steigende Yuan. Die S&P Put Scheine von Goldman haben amS ein sehr hohes
Aufgeld ich präferiere Einzelwerte ins Visier zu nehmen. Und da gibt es
jede Menge Schrott , der sich putten lässt.
Technical Analysis
Oil's Not Well to End Well
By Jeff Cooper
Street Insight Contributor
9/11/2006 7:22 AM EDT
The story of the week was the unwinding of the oil trade.
Something had to give, with crude oil hanging up above $70 a barrel following a record spike to a new high near $77 -- above the prior high of $71 -- even as many stocks in the group traded meaningfully below anything near new highs.
As the U.S. Oil Fund (USO) telegraphed, the oil trade was poised to come apart like a dime-store toy. The decline underscored the power of my Rule of Four Breakdown pattern. As anticipated when I showed the chart, the unraveling in the oil stocks shed substantial point count from the S&P 500 -- perhaps enough so to do enough technical damage to cause the index to break support.
And, of course, momentum begets momentum. In other words, the break in the oils could be the catalyst that causes the S&P to go into a spiral. The key level on crude oil is $69. This is conjunct with the zero point of the year, or March 21. The $77 high on oil looks like a 90-degree overthrow.
There does not look to be any support on oil until $61, which is 180 degrees down from $77 and 90 degrees down from $69. The ideal date for such a square-out will be Sept. 23 or into the last week of September. Consequently, if you are bullish on the group, I would not venture in expecting anything more than one- to two-day rallies until that time.
However, for the time being, the S&P 500 has held support impressively. This is because money fleeing the oil stocks has been put to work in other groups. This fact underscores near-term bullish sentiment still prevalent among market participants. This bullish sentiment may yet lead to a squeeze play into options expiration this coming Friday.
I say this also because many times the Thursday in the week prior to options expiration is a misdirection day. I have noticed that on the Thursday in the week preceding options expiration the S&P often closes at the extreme opposite direction of what the options expiration arbs have up their sleeves.
Moreover, causing yet more emotional crosscurrent is the five-year anniversary of 9/11 on Monday. As you know, the five-year or 60-month cycle is an important fractal of the 60-year cycle, which W.D. Gann called The Great Cycle. More than usual nervousness may abound coming on this anniversary on the heels of the uncovering of the recent terrorist plot in London and the lunar eclipse last Thursday, which many times acts as an emotional trigger point.
[Nun wird er aber wirklich albern - A.L.]
Consequently, the options expiration arbs may intend to unleash buy programs this week at the same time that the Plunge Protection Team will be at the helm to stem the tide of any exuberance on the part of the bears to attempt to capitalize on any nervousness over this 9/11.
The bottom line is that 1303/1305 S&P is resistance. If my cycle work is correct, we should not get a move much above that level. A move above 1305 that holds could inspire a larger squeeze than I anticipated.
At the same time, a break of Thursday's S&P low of the 1292 "square" may telegraph a move to 1280 and a necktie of the 200- and 50-day moving averages on the S&P for expiration.
Conclusion: The sign of the bear and the downside pressure that many cycles should be exerting here may be signified by this week's outside-down week on the S&P. Such was the case with the outside-down week in early May, which led to a significant decline. The market is in a dangerous position. Therefore, I would not overstay your positions in longs. While at the same time, if the trend has turned, shorting weakness should prove to be a favorable strategy.
| U.S. Oil Fund (USO) Daily |
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| Tesoro (TSO) Daily |
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| Valero Energy (VLO) Daily |
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Jeff Cooper is the creator of the Hit and Run Methodology
nicht hinter den der dot.com größen verstecken.
http://www.immobilienblasen.blogspot.com/
oilweekly.png (verkleinert auf 39%)
Quelle: www.thelongwaveanalyst.ca
Die Grafik kommt zwar von Leuten, die im Moment Gold verkaufen wollen, trotzdem liegt sie mir schwer im Magen. Und nach allem, was ich hier bisher gelesen habe! Nichts für Day-trader, aber für Leute, die ihren Keller rechtzeitig mit Futter füllen wollen.
Don't Let the Market Dictate Your Outlook
By Cody Willard
TheStreet.com Contributor
9/13/2006 9:50 AM EDT
Traders' emotions are strongly driven by the near-term swings and action in the market. And emotions, like it or not, have a huge impact on our trading. But, at least when you're playing the market, emotions are the enemy.
Good traders have to strive to keep emotions out of their mindset. Of course, that doesn't mean we can just ignore the near-term action, but it does a trader no favors to flip-flop based on the day-to-day activity of the market.
One of the main reasons I eschew technical analysis is because it often works to incorporate into trades emotions that come from near-term swings. When technicians draw a line and say that the market has dropped through it and therefore should be sold, they're usually also saying that they've been too long and must alleviate some of the emotional pain from those losses.
Meanwhile, it's not as if the fundamental folk have it figured out, either. How many fundamental analysts and economists are wondering if the market's return to recent highs indicates that the fundamental outlook for earnings is as good now as it was bad in July? Are the inventory concerns in tech no problem at all? Will housing's problems be completely swamped by a continuing booming economy? That's what emotionally driven fundamentalists have to ask themselves all day. And, yes, we're all emotionally driven, including your faithful author.
The semiconductors were up nearly 5% yesterday and are up about 7% from Monday's ugly open. Then again, they're up only 1% in the past week and down about 10% on the year. So what's the market telling us about the fundamentals? Depends on where you choose to place your emotionally driven fundamental/technical analysis starting point.
Perhaps we should continue to listen to the conferences, talk to our sources, read every report and analyze those inputs as best we can to keep our analysis grounded in reality instead of letting the market dictate our outlook.
My homework, as emotionally independent as I can keep it, indicates that the fundamental outlook is steady and OK. The inventory issues in tech aren't problems (yet?), but neither is business booming.
mfg J.B.
P.S. Ich poste hier meine Trades nicht, weil es in diesem Thread um die mittelfristige Ausrichtung geht, nicht um das, was in den Daytrading-Threads läuft. Das werde ich auch in Zukunft so halten - bis ich meine, nun sei die Zeit für längerfristige Long-Einstiege gekommen.
Kontraindikator? Vielleicht bin ich einer (für Dich), aber warten wir erst mal ab, was uns der goldene Oktober dieses Jahr noch an überreifen Trauben bringt ;-))
Mit der Grafik klappt das irgendwie nicht. Man kann sich das hier anschauen:
http://www.thelongwaveanalyst.ca/cycle.html
Ein ausführlicher Artikel ist hier:
http://www.telepolis.de/r4/artikel/17/17453/1.html
Grundsätzliche Aussage:
Das Wirtschaftsleben läuft in, ca. 56 Jahre dauernden, Kondratieffzyklen ab. Demnach wäre jetzt wieder eine Depression angesagt wie 1929!